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0. OBJECT OF THE COMMENTARY 
Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: diliges, inquit, proximum 
tuum tamquam te ipsum, deum vero ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente.
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1. AUGUSTINIAN HERMENEUTICS 
In principle, the procedure for the interpretation of scripture laid 
out in Augustine’s De doctrina christiana is as straightforward as it is 
well-known. All  biblical  passages should  be referred to the double 
commandment to love God and to love your neighbor as yourself. 
No matter what a given chapter and verse would seem to say, its 
ultimate meaning is no more and no less than what has been called 
the “doctrine of charity.” To understand holy writing is to discover in 
what way it can be seen to command the double love of God and 
other  people. Accordingly,  were Augustine  to produce  a scriptural 
concordance, every verse would point its reader to Matthew 22:37-9 
and the associated places where the “twin commandments” can be 
found, and under the entries for these verses would be recapitulated 
the holy writings in their entirety. Augustine does not shy away from 
the implications of his method. For he does not stop at saying that 
anyone who thinks he understands some part of the sacred writings, 
but makes no reference to the “twin love” of God and neighbor, has 
in fact failed to understand it at all. He goes so far as to maintain that, 
so too, anyone who does come up with a reading that promotes this 
love, but misses what the person who wrote the passage in question 
really meant to say, “has not made a fatal error, and is certainly not a 
liar.”
2 To discover a reference to the commandments of  love in a 
                                                                                                 
1 Augustine, De doctrina, I.22. All passages from this work are taken from the 
edition by R. P. H. Green with an accompanying translation; Green’s English 
has been modified where indicated. 
2 Ibid., I.36. Quisquis igitur scripturas divinas vel quamlibet earum partem intellexisse 
sibi videtur, ita ut eo intellectu non aedificet istam geminam caritatem dei et proximi, GLOSSATOR 5 
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passage  where  no  such  reference  exists  is,  if  only  minimally,  to 
understand it. 
  This  is  a  precept  and  a  method  for  the  production  of 
commentary. It is not a question of declaring that such a reference is 
invariably  present but in  elaborating  each  time  the itinerary along 
which it will pass. This is in no small part because the transfer of 
sense Augustine calls for is not only a movement from one location to 
another within the biblical corpus: the reason a given passage is to be 
brought back to the commandments is that it will be brought thereby 
to other people. Here is the doctrina of the book’s title: an instruction 
of other people consisting in explaining to them the meaning of the 
holy writings.
3 For these writings are sometimes more and sometimes 
less obscure, but they will become clear from first to last when they 
have  been  commented  in  such  a  way  that  their  clarities  and 
obscurities both are referred to the commandments of love. Although 
commentary thus conceived would appear, no doubt rightly, always 
to produce the same interpretation no matter what it has before it, 
this  seeming  reductiveness  is  only  the  inverse  of  the  great 
proliferation of explanations that must result when every verse, even 
the most intractable, is declared interpretable with reference to a 
single  precept,  and  explicable  to  even  the  least  apt .  But  the 
commentary Augustine instructs in will lead not just to sanctimonious 
redundancies for a reason mor e fundamental still. This is that the 
“twin  commandments”  are  themselves  refractory  to  the 
understanding,  their  meaning  obscure  not  only  incidentally  or 
temporarily but permanently and insofar as they remain scripture’s 
principle of intelligibility. The hermeneutic program laid out in De 
doctrina is founded squarely on an inability to understand the passage 
in whose light all others will become clear, as Augustine indicates in 
the  extraordinary  sentence  that  is  the  object  of  the  present 
commentary.
4 
                                                                                                 
nondum  intellexit.  Quisquis  vero  talem  inde  sententiam  duxerit,  ut  huic  aedificandae 
caritati sit utilis, nec tamen hoc dixerit quod ille quem legit eo loco sensisse probabitur, non 
perniciose fallitur nec omnino mentitur. On lying, cf. also De magistro 13. 
3 On doctrina, cf. Green, “Qué entendió San Agustin.” Still excellent remains 
Marrou, “Doctrina et disciplina.” 
4 If the frequency of its mention in certain circles is any guide, the threat of 
“Robertsonianism”  remains  keenly  felt.  But  to  seek  references  to  an 
Augustinian “doctrine of charity” in medieval literary texts might turn out to 
be a different endeavor than has been imagined, by champions and detractors 
alike, if that doctrine itself concerns not the positive enunciations of a law but KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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2. NOT OTHERWISE 
Given the apparent reducibility of all scriptural sententia to that of 
the twin commandments, it is first of all necessary to ask if the rest of 
scripture could just be dispensed with, and only the commandments 
themselves retained, for instance in the form in which they appear in 
Matthew: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the 
second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
5 But needless to 
say, Augustine does not go in for such an efficiency. This is because it 
is both pleasant and rewarding to be exercised by the obscurities of 
scripture.
6 Indeed, it is necessary to affirm of such writing that it 
should not have been written the least bit differently than it has been. 
For Christian sacred texts, and this is the presupposition of the 
“redeemed rhetoric” the later parts of De doctrina take up, are not only 
full of truth, Augustine claims, they are also eloquent. The question 
arises in Book IV whether it is fit to call auctores nostri eloquent, or 
whether theirs is a wisdom having nothing to do with the realm of 
rhetoric. The question, Augustine claims, is easily resolved: scripture 
is not only the wisest writing but also the most eloquent. “I venture to 
say,”  he  continues,  “that  all  who  correctly  understand  what  [our 
authors] are saying understand at the same time that it would not 
have been right for them to express it in any other way.”
7 The force 
of  this  suggestion  is  clear:  to  understand  scripture  at  all  is  to 
understand simultaneously (simul intellegere) that what is understood 
ought not to have been expressed otherwise. The very words used, 
no matter how resistant they may be to the would-be commentator, 
are the best and only words for the purpose.  
                                                                                                 
a  contentless  principle  of  intelligibility.  As  will  become  apparent  below, 
following  the  procedures  of  “historical  criticism”  to  the  letter  would  then 
mean discovering in failures of reference to the twin commandments the most 
closely guarded inheritance of Augustine’s law of love. (A summary of D. W. 
Robertson’s program can be found in his “Historical Criticism” and a recent 
and very rewarding appraisal of that program and its reception in  Justice, 
“Who Stole Robertson?”) 
5 As the King James version renders 22:37-39. 
6 Cf. e.g.  De doctrina,  II.6.  Nunc tamen nemo ambigit et per similitudines libentius 
quaeque  cognosci  et  cum  aliqua  difficultate  quaesita  multo  gratius  inveniri.  On  this 
point, cf. Pépin, “Saint Augustin et la fonction protreptique.” 
7 De doctrina, IV.6. Translation altered. Et audeo dicere omnes qui recte intellegunt 
quod illi loquuntur simul intellegere non eos aliter loqui debuisse. GLOSSATOR 5 
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Non aliter loqui debuisse,  moreover,  is  not  merely  a  question  of 
which particular words are used, but no less of the order in which 
they  appear.  This  becomes  explicit  in  Book  II,  when  Augustine 
undertakes to demonstrate the preeminence
8 of the Septuagint over 
all other translations: for, he writes, the mark of the divine assistance 
afforded  the  seventy  translators  is  that  even  though  they  were 
separated  each  in  his  own  cell,  “nothing  was  found  in  anyone’s 
version which was not found, in the same words and the same order 
of words, in the others.” And in the face of this agreement on words 
and their order, he continues, “who would dare to adapt such an 
authoritative  work,  let  alone  adopt  anything  in  preference  to  it?”
9 
The authority of the established scriptural text resides in the words it 
uses and in the order in which it uses them, and it defies anyone 
either to alter those words and their sequence or to put some other 
words, or sequence of words, in their stead. This remark about word 
order, furthermore, is not made casually, nor is it simply occasional; 
it  resumes  a  doctrine  found  in  Jerome’s  famous  remarks  on 
translation in his Epistle 57, where the inviolability of the sequence of 
words is the very distinguishing mark of sacred text: “in fact I not 
only admit but openly declare that in translation from Greek texts 
(except in the case of sacred Scripture, where the very order of the 
words is a mystery) I render the text, not word for word, but sense 
for sense.”
10 Ubi et verborum ordo mysterium est: in scripture, even the 
sequence of words is holy. 
 
3. AN ALTERED SEQUENCE 
These  then  are  the  lineaments  of  Augustinian  interpretation. 
Proper  understanding  of  scripture  consists  in  the  simultaneous 
activity of two distinguishable operations: a reading of the very words 
on the page in the order in which they appear and no other, and the 
discovery in them of a reference to the commandments to love God 
and the neighbor. Something very strange happens, however, when 
                                                                                                 
8 Note, however, Augustine’s preference of another version at IV.7, at which 
last it is exactly the insufficient literality of the Septuagint that causes him to 
prefer Jerome’s translation. 
9 De doctrina, II.15. …nihil in alicuius eorum codice inventum est quod non isdem verbis 
eodemque verborum ordine inveniretur in ceteris, quis huic auctoritati conferre aliquid, 
nedum praeferre audeat? 
10 Epistulae, 508; Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation, 48–9. KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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these commandments themselves first appear in Augustine’s text. His 
citation takes the following form: 
 
Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: diliges, 
inquit,  proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum,  deum  vero  ex toto 
corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente. 
 
For this is the divinely established rule of love: you shall 
love, it says, your neighbor as yourself, but God with all 
your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind.
11 
 
Needless to say, the commandments are in the wrong order . When 
the commentator  introduces that passage to which all others are 
meant to refer, he alters the order of words and adopts in preference 
to it his own rendering .  The  very  “summary  of  the  law”  itself  is 
subjected to a derangement. If to understand a passage is at once to 
see how it ought not to read otherwise than it does and to find in it a 
reference  to  the  twin  commandments,  to  read  the  twin 
commandments themselves—it seems—is to make them read otherwise 
than they do. And this alteration is in fact the mark of an  internal 
reference they undergo at Augustine’s hand, their being referred to 
themselves, each being brought back to the realm of the other. But 
this reference back to themselves consists in nothing else than their 
alteration.  
What they are referred to, in other words, is no longer entirely 
identifiable as the “double law” itself, insofar as the order of words is 
inseparable from their meaning; and thus it appears that Augustine’s 
citation at once alters the order of a scriptural passage and refers it to 
something that is not quite the commandments of love. This is for 
Augustinian  interpretation  to  reach  the  limit  separating  its  two 
simultaneous  operations.  The  citation  of  the  commandments  in  a 
mode of hysteron proteron allows a question to pose itself which might 
not otherwise have been addressed: if the means by which a given 
scriptural utterance becomes understandable is its being referred back 
to what has been understood already, the twin commandments, how 
are these themselves to be understood? The internal reference of the 
hysteron proteron is first of all an indication that their meaning is not 
                                                                                                 
11 De doctrina, I.22. Translation modified. GLOSSATOR 5 
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altogether  clear,  that  they  too  demand  to  be  understood.
12 They 
should thus prove susceptible to the method Augustine lays out.  
When faced with an expression that is not  yet understood, he 
says, the interpreter must determine whether it is  propria or figurata, 
literal or figurative.
13 This can be done by seeing in what way it can 
be referred  ad regnum caritatis: if the passage in question commands 
love proprie, it is not figurative, but if it seems to teach something 
other  than  or  opposed  to  love,  it  should  rather  be  considered  a 
figure.
14 That  is,  if  it  says  just  “love  god  and  the  neighbor,”  its 
significance is literal and no figurative explanation is to be sought. 
Augustine’s point is one that has been underscored in an important 
article by Kathy Eden: that the opposition between literal (propria) 
and  figurative  (figurata)  is  by  no  means  to  be  identified  with  that 
between  literal  (literalis)  and  spiritual  (spiritualis).  As  Eden  puts  it, 
“Augustine resists identifying the spiritual with the figurative reading, 
the  corporeal  with  the  literal  (propria),  and  preserves  at  least  a 
theoretical distinction” between them.
15 It is possible for the spiritual 
reading,  which  for  Augustine  will  always  consist  in  an  ultimate 
reference  to  the  twin  commandments,  to  correspond  to  the  literal 
meaning  of  the  words,  and  for  the  literal  sense  thus  to  take 
precedence over  the figurative. “Augustine, in  other words,” Eden 
writes, “upholds the literal over the figurative reading whenever the 
                                                                                                 
12 Augustine’s  influence  is  so  great  that  the  meaning  he  finds  in  the  two 
commandments, and even the fact that he finds such great meaning at all, 
seems  scarcely  remarkable;  its  novelty  will  be  seen  in  some  instructive 
remarks by Oliver O’Donovan: “it is surprising how little attention is paid to 
the ‘summary of the law,’ the ‘two commands’ of love-of-God and love-of-
neighbor,  in  either  the  Western  or  the  Eastern  Fathers.  Clement  of 
Alexandria and Origen both comment on the summary and argue that the 
‘neighbor’ whom we are to love second to God is Christ; Gregory of Nyssa 
mentions it, and adds as a third command love of one’s wife. ‘Barnabas’ 
tactfully glosses the phrase ‘as yourself’ to mean ‘more than your own life.’ 
Until more detailed research proves otherwise, we must make the supposition 
that Augustine is responsible not only for the currency of ‘self-love’ in the 
theology of the West but also  for the predominance of the ‘summary’ in 
Western Christian ethics.” Problem of Self-Love, 4. 
13 Cf.  De  doctrina,  III.24.  Maxime  itaque  investigandum  est  utrum  propria  sit  an 
figurata locutio quam intellegere conamur. 
14 Ibid., III.15. 
15 Eden, “Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics,” 58. KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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former provides an interpretation in keeping with charity. In some 
cases, then, the spiritual and the literal (propria) coincide.”
16 
  Chief among these “some cases” would of course be the giving 
of the law of charity itself. According to Augustine’s criteria, the twin 
commandments of love should be utterly literal, to be withheld totally 
from any figurative reading. It would be an absurdity, at best, to seek 
anything besides their literal meaning. It is instructive, however, to 
consider  the  account  Augustine  provides  of  figurative  expression: 
“the words in which it is expressed will be found to be taken either 
from things that are similar or things that are in some way connected 
[ab aliqua vicinitate attingentibus].”
17 What distinguishes figuration is that 
it produces signification by means of the similitude and vicinity that can 
obtain between things. While this might seem to be a reference to 
something  like  the  distinction  between  metaphor  and  metonymy, 
more than an identification of any particular types of figure, which 
Augustine  treats  elsewhere  and  distinctly,  this  is  the  return  in  De 
doctrina  of  exactly  what  his  inversion  of  the  commandments  has 
elided.  For  Augustine  does  not  only  alter  their  sequence;  he  also 
removes  from  between  them  the  verse  that,  in  the  form  they  are 
given in Matthew, separates the one from the other, 22:38: this is the 
first and great commandment, and the second is like it.  This  verse,  which 
declares—if  obscurely—both  the  fact  and  the  manner  of  the 
commandments’s twinness at the same time as it holds them apart by 
being interpolated between them, does not appear when the second 
commandment is placed before the first. For clearly its discussion of a 
first and  a  second  could  not  easily  survive  the  derangement  of  the 
sequence  to  which  these  ordinals  refer.  But  in  addition  to  the 
difficulty its retention would pose for Augustine’s hysteron proteron, the 
presence  of  the  verse  would  be  liable  to  raise  doubts  about  the 
exclusively literal nature of the commandments. What it declares is 
that a relation of similitude obtains between the two of them, and that, 
their being subsequent the one to the other, so too does a relation of 
vicinity.  Any  interpretation  of  the  commandments  taking  this  verse 
                                                                                                 
16 Ibid., 59. Denys Turner has remarked this point more recently, and with a 
slightly different emphasis, in his “Allegory in Christian late antiquity,” 77–8. 
On Augustine’s refusing, in a series of letters with Jerome, to deny a literally 
true meaning to any portion of scripture at all, cf.  Nirenberg, “Politics of 
Love,” 596–8. 
17 De doctrina, III.25. …verba quibus continetur aut a similibus rebus ducta invenientur 
aut ab aliqua vicinitate attingentibus. GLOSSATOR 5 
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into account would have to understand them insofar as something of 
their significance can be established on the basis of their being similar 
and proximate, and thus, according to Augustine’s own indications, 
insofar as they are at least partly figurative. 
   
4. TWINS 
The inversion of the commandments thus accomplishes at least 
two things: it is the recursive interpretive movement of a reference to 
the twin commandments having come up against its internal  limit; 
and it is the stripping from them of their susceptibility to figuration. It 
thus insists on their literal signification even as it makes plain that this 
is  not  altogether  established  in  advance.  Much  of  the  work  of  De 
doctrina goes, in fact, into establishing that literal meaning, and not just 
in the book devoted to things as over against signs, that is, the first 
book,  where  the  inversion  in  question  appears.  No,  the  precise 
elements  of  Augustine’s  inverting  commentary  on  the  twin 
commandments  must  be  pieced  together  from  indications  spread 
throughout the treatise. The way to do this is to work backwards 
from figurations to be found elsewhere in the book of the “literal” 
double law in its inverted form. Now, if Augustine instructs those 
who  would  interpret  holy  text  to  always  find  in  it  the  twin 
commandments, he does not neglect to follow his own dictum: for 
instance, and most famously, by identifying some twin-bearing sheep 
in the Song of Songs as an indubitable figure of, among other things, 
the  love  of  God  and  neighbor.
18 In so doing, because his reading 
there and elsewhere is by any measure quite far -fetched, he opens 
himself to such charges as that he peddles in mumbo -jumbo and 
“arbitrary exegesis and number-symbolism.”
19 There is agreement in 
some quarters that Augustine finds in scripture what he wants to find, 
indulging in a kind of hermeneutics of superstition that misrepresents 
totally indifferent things as if they were significant—as if they referred, 
namely, to the regnum caritatis when in fact they do not. But he himself 
has quite a bit to say about superstitious interpretation; and it appears 
to have gone unremarked, first of all by Augustine himself, that in 
that connection too he is centrally concerned with nothing else than a 
pair of twins. 
  Appearing as it does in a book preoccupied with what it calls 
tirelessly a gemina caritas, a dilectio gemina, the twin commandments of a 
                                                                                                 
18 Ibid., II.6.  
19 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 457. KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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twin love, this single mention of twins in De doctrina in an apparently 
distinct context should be attended to carefully. Augustine adduces a 
pair of twins, Jacob and Essau, in order to dispute the legitimacy of a 
superstitious interpretive system: horoscopy. Like ascribing meaning 
to bird flight or to the spilling of salt, divination according to astral 
position at the time of birth, Augustine declares, rests on arbitrary 
facts that take on significance only because of an agreement entered 
into  with  demons.  His  ire  is  directed  at  something  very  like  the 
“arbitrary exegesis” for which he will himself come under suspicion: 
“the signs by which this deadly agreement with demons is achieved 
have an effect that is in proportion to each individual’s attention to 
them . . . These signs are null and void unless accompanied by the 
observer’s agreement.”
20 The point is not first of all that superstitious 
interpretation leads to false results—for things regularly come to pass 
in  accordance  with  the  predictions  and  indications  of  these 
interpreters
21—but  that  it  is  based  on  demonic  rather  than  human 
convention. Still, the falsity of this basis can itself be demonstrated. 
To refute  horoscopy,  for  example, it suffices to  recall  that  “it can 
happen  that  some  twins  follow  one  another  so  closely  out  of  the 
womb that no interval of time can be perceived between them and 
recorded in terms of constellations. It follows that some twins have 
the same constellations, and yet their actions and experiences turn out 
to be not the same but often quite different.” 
  What will dismantle the claims of the arbitrary exegetes who 
read horoscopes, Augustine says,
22 is the inescapable presence of a 
minimal interval, what he goes on to call a  momentum minimum atque 
angustissimum temporis, quod geminorum partum disterminat: the smallest and 
most constrained moment of time, which separates the birth of twins. 
This  interval  is  at  once  that  by  which  twins  remain  always 
distinguishable, different people with different destinies, and the proof 
of  their  indistinguishability  under  the  scrutiny  of  a  certain 
                                                                                                 
20 De doctrina,  II.24.  .  .  .  sic etiam illa signa, quibus perniciosa daemonum societas 
comparatur, pro cuiusque observationibus valent . . . nulla ista signa sunt nisi consensus 
observantis accedat. 
21 Ibid., II.23. 
22 The argument certainly does not originate with Augustine; it can be found 
as well, for example, in De divinatione, II.43, where Cicero puts it in the mouth 
of Diogenes the Stoic. Augustine makes use of it in a great number of places, 
notably City of God, V.4 and Confessions, VII.6., where he ascribes his learning 
of  it  to  one  Firminus.  A  useful  account  of  its  history  can  be  found  in 
Hegedus, Early Christianity and Ancient Astrology, 43–84. GLOSSATOR 5 
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superstitious  reading.  This  minimal  temporal  difference  is  what 
definitively separates each twin into his own time and ensures that the 
two times remain impossible to tell apart, that they pass for a single 
time.  It  cannot  be  recorded,  and  by  the  same  token  it  cannot  go 
unrecognized, for its signs are everywhere apparent in the divergent 
lives of the twins whose birth it has separated: “one may live to be 
blissfully unhappy,” Augustine continues, “the other to be desperately 
unhappy, like Esau and Jacob who, we are told, were born as twins 
with Jacob, the second to be born, holding in his hand the foot of his 
brother born before him.”
23 
  Is this not just how the commandments themselves are born? 
Brought hand to foot by the deletion of an intervening verse (this is the 
first and great commandment . . . ), they are nevertheless still separated by 
the  “vero”  (and,  but,  in  truth)  Augustine  inserts  to  mark  their 
distinctness. This particle, however, is placed not between the two 
commandments  but  within  one  of  them,  so  that  even  as  they  are 
emphatically differentiated they nonetheless go on touching “hand to 
foot” with no separation at all: proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum deum 
vero ex toto corde,  “your  neighbor  as  yourself  god  however  with  all 
your heart.” And just as it is the confutation of interpretation not 
grounded in the commandments of love, what separates the birth of twins 
is  the  confirmation  of  the  reading  practice  Augustine  teaches. 
Inasmuch  as  it  is  a  figuration  of  the  “literal”  commandments,  the 
adducing of twins in the context of the confutation of horoscopy can 
only  be  understood  to  mean  that  there  is  a  minimal  difference, 
impossible  to  ignore  and  impossible  to  record,  between  the 
commandment  to  love  God  and  the  commandment  to  love  your 
neighbor.  
 
5. LOVE OF SELF 
Augustine does not fail to name this minimal difference. When 
the two commandments change places, when the moment in which 
each is uttered becomes the moment in which the other is uttered, 
they remain distinct, the love of God being distinguishable from the 
love of the neighbor. But something else emerges when their order is 
                                                                                                 
23 De doctrina, II.22. Unde necesse est nonnullos geminos easdem habere constellationes, 
cum paria rerum vel quas agunt vel quas patiuntur eventa non habeant, sed plerumque ita 
disparia  ut  alius  felicissimus,  alius  infelicissimus  vivat,  sicut  Esau  et  Iacob  geminos 
accipimus natos ita ut Iacob, qui posterior nascebatur, manu plantam praecedentis fratris 
tenens inveniretur. KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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changed,  something  that  might  otherwise  have  escaped  notice. 
“Although love of God comes first and the manner of loving him is 
clearly laid down,” Augustine writes, “nothing seems to have been 
said about self-love. But when it is said at the same time [simul] ‘you 
shall  love  your  neighbor  as  yourself,’  your  own  self-love  is  not 
neglected.”
24 Because the commandment to love God comes first, in 
other  words,  something  remains  obscure;  and  this  obscure  thing 
emerges into clarity not when eventually the second commandment 
comes to be issued but rather when it is said simul, at the same time 
as,  in  the  very  time  of  the  first.
25  What  emerges  when  the 
commandments switch places is that your love of yourself is seen not 
to have been left out after all. 
  The alteration of their sequence thus constitutes an attempt to 
come to grips with one of the more daunting of the obscurities that 
prevent the literal meaning of the commandments from being already 
understood, namely, the force and function of the words  as yourself. 
When nothing at all has yet been said about loving yourself, already 
it is the model on which another kind of love is to occur, the love of 
other people. Augustine’s solution to this difficulty is, in brief,
26 to 
claim  that  everyone loves  himself, whether he wants to or  not, 
whether commanded to do so or otherwise, by a kind of natural law; 
but that the commandment to love God entirely means that he 
should  refer  that  inevitable  and  ineradicable  love  to  God,  to  love 
                                                                                                 
24  Ibid.,  I.26.  Translation  modified.  Cum  enim  praecurrat  dilectio  dei  eiusque 
dilectionis modus praescriptus appareat, ita ut cetera in illum confluant, de dilectione tua 
nihil dictum videtur. Sed cum dictum est,  diliges  proximum  tuum  tamquam  te 
ipsum, simul et tui abs te dilectio non praetermissa est. 
25 The  second  commandment’s  issuing  in  a  first  instance  can  be  seen  as 
following  from  the  necessary  firstness  of  all  commendment—from  the 
coincidence of “commandment” and “origin” in the word arche that has been 
the emphasis of recent lectures by Giorgio Agamben. Insofar as the place of 
commandment  and  the  place  of  origin  are  the  same,  if  it  is  to  be  any 
commandment at all the second commandment must occupy the position of 
the “first and great.” But it should be noted here that what Augustine says 
will emerge when the second commandment attains to its first position is 
something else again, a third element alluded to in this second commandment 
but not located there. 
26 Considerations of space preclude an adequate discussion of this matter; 
Oliver O’Donovan’s study The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine is much to 
be recommended, as are the careful and thorough readings contained in two 
articles by Raymond Canning: “Love of Neighbor in St. Augustine”; “Love 
your Neighbor as Yourself.” GLOSSATOR 5 
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himself not for his own sake but for the sake of God. And thus as 
yourself is to say, “in the same way that you are to love yourself”: by 
referring love from one thing to another; so that in short the neighbor 
too is to be loved not for his own sake but for the sake of God. This 
is the doctrine Augustine lays out in Book I of De doctrina. But why 
does he think it becomes clear when the order of the commandments 
is altered? For nothing further has been said about the love of self, 
only the order has changed, and indeed the Matthean intervening 
verse removed. What consultation with the example of the twins who 
confute horoscopy makes clear, however, is that love of self is “not 
left  out,”  non  praetermissa  est,  when  the  minimal  interval  obtaining 
between the commandments is made to appear. Love of self is just the 
interval separating love of God from love of neighbor. 
  Neither the positivity of a natural law nor the imperative of a 
commandment, the love of self as it shows itself here is no more and 
no  less  than  the  possibility  of  distinguishing  between  the  love  of 
neighbor and the love of God. But if it is the possibility of telling the 
difference it is at once the impossibility of telling what that difference 
might be, like the obvious but unregistrable distinction between the 
moments of the birth of twins. The self-love that is revealed in the re-
ordering  of  the  commandments  answers  to  a  different  description 
than the self-love that is dictated inconcussa naturae lege, by an unshaken 
law  of  nature,  though  no  doubt  they  are  the  same  love.  What 
Augustine  uncovers  is  not  amour  propre,  not  self-esteem,  not  the 
pulsing  of the organism in  self-preservation: it is rather the barest 
understanding,  a  minimal  recognition  that  there  is  a  difference 
between love of other people and love of God, that other people are 
not God, nor God other people. This knowledge is simultaneous and 
coincident  with  a  permanent  failure  to  understand  in  what  that 
difference might consist, just as the good interpreter knows even less, 
perhaps, than the reader of horoscopes what will be the particular 
fates of two twins born under the same constellations, but unlike him 
does know that these fates are not, in principle, the same. What this 
amounts to is a final impossibility of saying how and why there is not 
simply one commandment of love but two. 
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6. TWO ORDERS 
Still, that there are and must be two cannot be doubted.
27 What 
remains  uncertain,  however,  is  how  Augus tine  conceives  of  the 
inverting operation by which he brings about the interpretability of 
the commandments, an operation so seemingly at odds with his 
hermeneutic program.  De doctrina  itself  is  of  no  help  here,  but  an 
explanation  is  not  lacking.  It  is  to  be  found  elsewhere,  in  the 
seventeenth of Augustine’s tractates on John.
28 In that commentary, 
on  John  5:8,  the  method  for  interpreting  scripture  laid  out  in  De 
doctrina can be observed in full swing: Augustine takes Christ’s words 
to a sick man “Arise, take up your bed and walk” to signify, as might 
be expected, nothing else than the twin commandments. That there 
are three imperatives here gives the commentator only the slightest 
pause: “He said three things: ‘Arise,’ ‘Take up your bed,’ and ‘walk.’ 
But ‘Arise’ was not a command of work, but the working of a cure. 
But he commanded the cured man two things, ‘Take up your bed 
and  walk.’”  Having  dispensed  with  the  word  arise,  Augustine 
continues: “How, then, may we find, in these two commands of the 
Lord, those two commandments of love signified?” He explains that, 
in the sick bed, the invalid has been taken care of by others; so that 
                                                                                                 
27  This  notwithstanding  the  widely  held  view  that  Augustine  so  far 
subordinates the love of neighbor to that of God that, in effect, he does away 
with it altogether. Among the more vituperative—and influential—statements 
of this position (where Augustine is guilty of a “perversion” that “destroys 
just  what  is  most  characteristic  of  the  Christian  idea  of  love”)  is  that  of 
Anders Nygren: “It is a basic idea of Augustine’s that the commandments of 
love to God and to neighbor are not really two, but one single command. God 
is the only worthy object of our love. When God commands us to love our 
neighbor, we are not strictly to love our neighbor, who is not worthy of such 
love, but God in our neighbor.” (Agape and Eros, 97–8; 549. A summary of 
the debate over Nygren’s claims will be found in O’Donovan, “Usus and 
Fruitio,”  361–4.)  So  also  e.g.  Hannah  Arendt:  “every  beloved  is  only  an 
occasion to love God [….] It is not really the neighbor who is loved in this 
love of neighbor—it is love itself” (Love and Saint Augustine, 97.) Although it is 
quite true that Augustine allows himself to be understood in this way, it is 
exactly the purpose of his inversion of the commandments to make plain 
their absolute discretion, even as it is to insist that both loves, not just that of 
the  neighbor,  are  always  virtually  each  other.  The  idea  that  Augustine 
considers love of the neighbor a special and inferior case of love of God is 
strictly mistaken. 
28 The following passages will be found in Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 36, 
173–5; Tractates on the Gospel of John, 2:115–17. GLOSSATOR 5 
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take up your bed means to take care of those others, and thus signifies 
love your neighbor. Moreover, and walk means that the sick man should 
not simply care for others but should conduct them toward God, so 
that it can be seen to signify, in its turn, love God. 
  This explication shows take up your bed and walk to be a figuration 
of the double commandment love your neighbor as yourself and love God: a 
figuration of the commandments not, in other words, in their proper 
sequence but in the same order they are given when they first appear 
in De doctrina. Augustine is quite aware that this irregularity demands 
an explanation, and he provides one: 
 
The  love  of  God  is  first  in  the  order  of  commandment 
[praecipiendi], but the love of neighbor is first in the order of 
action. For one who would enjoin [praecipere] this love on 
you  in  two  commandments  [praeceptis]  would  not 
recommend to you the neighbor first and God afterwards, 
but  God  first  and  the  neighbor  afterwards.  But  because 
you  do  not  yet  see  God,  by  loving  your  neighbor  you 
merit  seeing  him;  by  loving  your  neighbor  you  cleanse 
your eye for seeing God. 
 
This is, at last, the answer Augustine will offer to the questions this 
essay  has  posed.  Dei dilectio prior  est ordine praecipiendi,  proximi autem 
dilectio prior est ordine faciendi. There is an order of doing and an order 
of commanding, and the one is the inverse of the other. To put the 
love of the neighbor before the love of God is not to derange the 
order of commanding but rather to observe the order of doing.  
What,  however,  is  the  ordo  faciendi?  Where  is  it  in  effect? 
Augustine’s homiletic remarks allow it to be imagined that it is you 
who are commanded who follow the order of doing in carrying out 
commandments  issued  in  their  own  proper  order.  And  this  is  no 
doubt the case. Christ commands in the order of commanding; you 
obey according to the order of doing. But the occasion of Augustine’s 
making  this  distinction,  the  instance  of  ordo  faciendi  that  must  be 
explained, is nothing else than an imperative issued by Christ, namely 
take up your bed and walk. It is these words that follow the order of 
doing, and not first of all any action you may or may not take: so that 
the ordo faciendi is, in the first place, that sequence in which Christ 
himself  rephrases  the  twin  commandments  for  the  purposes  of 
instruction. In other words, if to do the commandments is to invert 
them, this is not because, generally speaking, doing is the reciprocal KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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form  of  commanding.  Facere  praecepta  does  not  merely  entail  but 
consists  in  hysteron  proteron:  the  inversion  of  the  order  of  the 
commandments is itself their observation. 
As  Augustine  has  it,  the  reason  Christ  rephrases  his  own 
commandments  is  that  in  their  proper  order—the  order  of 
commanding—they are obscure. What is necessary is a “cleansing of 
the eye” that will be brought about by putting the love of neighbor 
before the love of God, by substituting for the ordo praecipiendi an ordo 
faciendi that will make the meaning of the twin commandments clear. 
In short, to alter the sequence of the commandments as Augustine 
does in De doctrina is to fulfill them by making them understandable to 
others. This is why, as Oliver O’Donovan has rightly summarized, 
“in practical terms”—as who should say, in the ordo faciendi—“love of 
the neighbor is evangelism.”
29 It is to produce, for the purposes of 
doctrina, a minimal commentary, one whose operation is to change the 
sequence of the verses that are its object and to remove from around 
and between them every other verse, while maintaining the totality of 
scripture, down to its last particular, as virtually present in the two 
verses remaining. At the heart of the hermeneutic homiletics of De 
doctrina is this mere slip of an exposition, a form of commentary that 
adds nothing more to the commented text than a particle (“vero”), 
but  reduces  and  reordinates  what  is  to  be  read  in  view  of  its 
impartability. So that what is spread abroad in love of neighbor as 
“evangelism” is the barest interpretability of the commandments, and 
it  is  because  even  that  interpretability  is  not  assured  in  advance, 
because it must be taught, that love can operate at all: “there would 
be no way for love, which ties people together in the bonds of unity, 
to make souls overflow and as it were intermingle with each other, if 
human beings learned nothing from other humans.”
30 The proximity 
in which love of neighbor can come about is the fact that you are 
susceptible of being taught.  
 
7. VITA AETERNA 
A recent collection of essays on the neighbor has begun with the 
axiom,  as  it  affirms,  “that  it  is  only  with  the  emergence  of  the 
psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious—with the emergence of the 
                                                                                                 
29 Problem of Self-Love, 112. 
30 De doctrina, praefatio. Deinde ipsa caritas, quae sibi homines invicem nodo unitatis 
astringit, non haberet aditum refundendorum et quasi miscendorum sibimet animorum, si 
homines per homines nihil discerent. GLOSSATOR 5 
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subject  of  psychoanalysis—that  we  can  truly  grasp  the  ethical  and 
political complexity introduced into the world by the injunction to 
love one’s neighbor as oneself.”
31 This psychoanalytic concept of the 
self is put to compelling use there; and yet it is worth noting that in 
Augustine’s account, in which the authors show little interest, it is 
exactly the “complexity introduced into the world by the injunction 
to love one’s neighbor as oneself” that generates its own “emergence 
of the subject.” In De doctrina, that is, the interpretive difficulty of the 
commandments  discloses  a  love  of  self  otherwise  withheld. 
Augustine’s  reading  sets  up  a  thinking  of  the  self  as  minimal 
differentiability between other people and God that remains distinct 
both  from  the  “psychoanalytic  concept  of  the  self”  and  from  the 
Levinasian subject to which it is opposed.
32 The authors are entirely 
right to maintain that “neighbor-love functions more as an obstacle to 
its own theorization than as a roadmap for ethical life…the injunction 
to ‘love your neighbor as yourself’ involves interpretive and practical 
aporias  in  all  its  individual  terms,  and  even  more  so  as  an 
utterance…something  in  the  call  to  neighbor-love  remains  opaque 
and  does  not  give  itself  up  willingly  to  univocal  interpretation.”
33 
Consultation with Augustine allows for the further specifications that 
these interpretive aporias are the very basis of neighbor-love itself, as 
the  possibility  of  doctrina;  and  that  what  remains  opaque  to 
interpretation is the self as minimal differentiability, an obstacle to 
theorization but the beginning of love as sharing of intelligibility. 
For  De  doctrina  presents  love  of  neighbor  as  a  program  for 
producing and understanding a certain kind of commentary: one that 
builds up gemina caritas  by locating the  minimal  difference between 
love of God and love of neighbor; considering it as their principle of 
intelligibility; and identifying it as a form of self-love without positive 
content, consisting only in the slightest recognition that there is—that 
it itself is—some distinction. Commentary thus conceived consists in 
the exposition of an unregistrable differentiation, that is, it amounts 
finally to a reading of no text at all. Its object is not this passage of 
scripture or this other but what maintains some distinction between 
them even when they have been chopped up, rearranged, expunged. 
Likewise, when it is before its proper object commentary speaks in its 
own voice only a single word, a mere particle, some indeterminately 
                                                                                                 
31 Žižek, Santner, and Reinhard, The Neighbor, 10. 
32 Cf. especially Žižek’s contribution to the volume. 
33 The Neighbor, 5. KIRK – WHAT SEPARATES 
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assenting  punctuation:  vero.  Commentary  is  thus,  at  its  most 
characteristic, the minimization to the point almost of removal of both 
its  object  and  itself.  In  this  it  resembles  Augustine’s  famous 
description, in another of his commentaries on John, of the “eternal 
life” as a fullness of understanding in the presence not of the text of 
the gospel but of its giver, “when the pages of the text and voice of 
the reader and the exegete have been removed.”
34 Commentary is the 
production, today,
35 of this fullness of understanding. Its eternal life is 
the  working  of  a  minimal  intelligibility  assured  only  by  human 
instruction: the understanding that God is not other people and other 
people not God, coincident with the utter failure to understand in 
what their difference might consist. This utter failure is the paradise 
of a self-love without object. 
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